Real thaw with China still far

On a day that national security adviser Ajit Doval met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Russia and both sides agreed to work with urgency to ensure “complete disengagement” in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), external affairs minister S Jaishankar said about 75% of this work has been completed by the two sides. However, Jaishankar was quick to point out other major issues bedevilling the bilateral relationship, including the increased militarisation of the disputed border, China’s activities across the Indian Ocean, and the growing imbalance in two-way trade. While it is true that India and China could have completed three-fourths of the disengagement of frontline forces in Ladakh sector after dozens of rounds of diplomatic and military talks in the past four years, the 25% that remains is the most complex part of the military face-off at Depsang and Demchok. Security experts have contended that these regions are more strategic for India’s posture in this stretch of the LAC, which is probably why New Delhi is unwilling to accept any proposal from Beijing that would leave Indian troops in a disadvantageous position. Then, there is the issue of de-escalation, or pulling back the 50,000-odd troops arrayed by both sides on the LAC since mid-2020 to peacetime positions. The Chinese side has given no indication that it intends to revert to the position before the standoff, especially if its ramping up of military and dual-use infrastructure in the region opposite Ladakh and creation of dozens of villages, some in disputed territories, are anything to go by.

India, as Jaishankar put it, is yet to understand why China violated several long-standing border management agreements and moved troops close to the LAC. It is also telling that the Indian readout after the Doval-Wang meeting spoke of redoubling efforts to realise complete disengagement and abiding by past bilateral agreements, whereas the Chinese side’s statement on the same event only mentioned the proper handling of differences with pragmatism.

The current situation at the LAC is not tenable for both countries, as having so many troops in close proximity to each other increases the possibility of a mishap or misunderstanding. Unless, of course, China’s intention is to use in Ladakh the same playbook it has used so adroitly to push its position in the South China Sea, with scant regard for the international rules-based order. The other worrisome issues — the “very unfair and imbalanced” economic relationship, lack of access for Indian goods in Chinese markets, national security considerations with regard to Chinese investments and business ties, and China’s growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean — need to be clubbed with the situation on the frontier as India has always maintained, and not the other way around, as Beijing keeps insisting, if a worthwhile way forward is to be found by the two sides.

China is perceived by a majority of Indians as the country’s foremost challenge. China’s actions, be they at the LAC or in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait, have only served to reinforce this opinion. Talk from Beijing about India and China, as two ancient eastern civilisations, working for the long-term interests of their peoples and a “win-win” situation will remain just that, and offer no real prospects for a lasting resolution of the border issue.