Northeastern View | What Mizoram CM’s statement on Chin-Rakhine relations tells us about the crisis in western Myanmar

The suggestion sparked a bitter response from the Chin National Front (CNF), the dominant armed group in Chin State. Why did the Mizoram CM comment on what Chins in Chin State should do? Why is the CNF unhappy about that?

Mizo-Chin affinities

The Mizoram CM, who belongs to the Zoram People’s Movement (ZPM) party and took charge last December following a historic election, made the suggestion for Chin-Rakhine detente at what his office referred to as a “Chin Community Meeting Programme” in Indianapolis.

To a lay observer, Lalduhoma’s remarks might seem unwarranted. But, a closer look at its ethno-political context says otherwise. The Mizo and the Chin share a deep fraternal relationship. Both belong to the “Zo” ethnic super-group whose historical legacies transcend the colonial-era border between India and Myanmar.

Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, Mizoram has continued to firmly support the Chin refugees who have crossed the border for shelter or seek emergency medical aid. It is no secret, moreover, that Chin political workers and civil society representatives have historically shuttled across the unfenced Mizo-Chin international border for official and unofficial engagements.

Therefore, Lalduhoma, as the high political representative of the Mizos, has some locus standi to comment on Chin affairs. His request has drawn the CNF’s ire not because a Mizo CM commented on Chin affairs on foreign soil, but because of the Chin armed group’s own hostile relationship with the Arakan Army (AA).

Chin factionalism

The CNF, which currently dominates the ‘Chinland Council’ (CC), a newly-formed coalition of Chin revolutionary groups, sees the AA as an intruder in Chin State. These anxieties deepened as the AA, in recent months, gradually occupied large swathes of territory in southern Chin State after pushing out the Myanmar military.

The AA has also joined hands with the Chin Brotherhood (CB), another Chin revolutionary coalition comprising, among others, local anti-junta armed groups known as Chin Defence Forces (CDF). This strategic alliance, combined with other differences, has soured relations between the CNF-led CC and the CB. The CNF’s sharp response to Lalduhoma’s remarks should be seen in that distinct context.

What seems to have particularly irked the group is the CM’s claim that the AA is “stronger than” the Chins and has “large numbers of troops”. In a media statement, the group’s vice-chairman, Sui Khar, responded to this by arguing that the AA’s strength in itself should not dictate the Mizoram government’s position. Lalduhoma's assessment, therefore, appears to have hit the CNF's perception of its own relative strength.

Historically, further, the CNF and affiliated organisations have enjoyed warm relations with successive governments in Aizawl and influential Mizo civil society organisations, such as the Young Mizo Association (YMA). It has also looked to Mizoram for broader political patronage. That is perhaps why the group feels betrayed by Lalduhoma’s remarks.

The logic of the remarks

There are three possible interrelated reasons why Lalduhoma made the suggestion.

One, the Centre, which sees the Mizoram government as an interlocutor for engagement with Chin armed groups, might have nudged the CM to encourage the CNF and affiliated groups to fix their relations with the AA and associated Chin rival factions.

This is largely because intra-Chin and Chin-Rakhine disunity have complicated New Delhi’s strategic outreach to western Myanmar following the junta’s loss of control over large parts of the borderlands. This outreach is largely aimed at stabilising the border areas so that India can resume work on the high-stakes Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit and Transport Project (KMMTTP) that passes through northern Rakhine and southern Chin States.

Two, the CB – CNF’s rival Chin faction – might have lobbied with the Mizo political class in Aizawl to legitimise its own alliance with the AA and get unimpeded access to cross-border supply routes. This is important because since June, the Central Young Lai Association (CYLA), a Lai volunteer organisation based in southern Mizoram’s Lawngtlai district, has been trying to block supplies to southern Chin State and Rakhine State where the CB and AA mostly operate. The CYLA shares the CNF’s hostile perception of the AA as an anti-Chin force.

Three, Lalduhoma might want to project himself as a conflict mediator and by extension, a force for good in the broader Mizo-Chin community. This would not just elevate his own status in the region, but also position him as an alternative to K Vanlalvena, the sole Rajya Sabha MP from his rival party, Mizo National Front (MNF), who visited southern Chin State and met the AA for talks in February.

Interestingly also, the Mizoram-based Zo Reunification Organisation (ZORO) already hosted talks between the two rival Chin factions on August 21. The CM’s peacemaking suggestions could be seen in that same spirit.

Cross-border stability

Both Aizawl and New Delhi seek a stable cross-border environment to manage the adverse fallouts of the Myanmar crisis in India. To that end, both would want to have stable relations with the Chin and Rakhine groups who control most of the borderlands today including the official trading checkpoint at Zokhawthar.

Stable relations, however, can only be achieved by minimising the internal friction between various revolutionary forces across western Myanmar. But, the CNF’s embittered response to Lalduhoma shows that this won’t come easy.

Angshuman Choudhury is a researcher and writer from Assam, and currently a joint PhD candidate in Comparative Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore and King’s College London. The views expressed are personal